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Theories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue that fair-minded people should aspire to 
make choices for society as if in the original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents 
them from knowing their own social positions in society. In this paper, we provide a framework showing 
that preferences in front of the veil of ignorance (i.e., in face of every day risky situations) are entirely 
determined by ethical preferences behind the veil. Moreover, by contrast with Kariv & Zame (2008), in 
many cases of interest, the converse is not true: ethical decisions cannot be deduced from economic ones. 
This not only rehabilitates distributive theories of justice but even proves that standard decision theory in 
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RESUME :  
 
Les théories de la justice dans l'esprit de Rawls et d'Harsanyi reposent sur l'idée que l'aspiration à l'équité 
peut se représenter par la « situation originelle », i.e., par une situation où ceux qui décident des choix de 
sociétés sont placés derrière un voile d'ignorance qui interdit de connaître son propre statut social. Dans 
cet article, nous proposons un cadre théorique permettant de montrer que les préférences liées aux 
décisions « devant » le voile (i.e., en face de situations économiques quotidiennes) sont entièrement 
déterminées par les préférences éthiques qui s'expriment « derrière » le voile. De plus, à l'inverse de Kariv 
& Zame (2008), nous montrons que, dans biens des cas, la réciproque n'est pas vraie : les décisions 
éthiques ne sauraient être déduites des décisions économiques. Ceci non seulement réhabilite les théories 
distributives de la justice mais encore prouve que la théorie de la décision dans un contexte économique 
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II Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent?∗
Ga¨ el Giraud and C´ ecile Renouard
December 22, 2009
Abstract.— Theories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue
that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society as if in the
original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from
knowing their own social positions in society. In this paper, we provide a
framework showing that preferences in front of the veil of ignorance (i.e., in
face of everyday risky situations) are entirely determined by ethical preferences
behind the veil. Moreover, by contrast with Kariv & Zame (2008), in many
cases of interest, the converse is not true: ethical decisions cannot be deduced
from economic ones. This not only rehabilitates distributive theories of jus-
tice but even proves that standard decision theory in economic environments
cannot be separated from ethical questioning.
Keywords. Moral preferences, business ethics, social preferences, distributional jus-
tice, theory of justice, social choice, original position, veil of ignorance, utilitarianism,
maximin principle.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D63.
∗ We thank Jacques Dr` eze and Fran¸ cois Maniquet for helpful comments. The usual caveat applies.
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1 Introduction
Rawls (1971, 1974) and Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1975) have constructed theories of social
justice based on the choices that representatives should make for society in what Rawls
names the “original position”, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents people from know-
ing their own future positions. Rawls (1971) views preferences in the original position as
having a diﬀerent nature from “ordinary” preferences for consumption, for risk or for the
distribution of social goods to others. Rawls speciﬁes that the parties in the original posi-
tion are concerned only with citizens’ share of what he calls primary social goods, which
include basic rights as well as economic and social advantages. Rawls also argues that the
representatives in the original position would adopt the maximin rule as their principle
for evaluating the choices before them, i.e., making the choice that produces the highest
payoﬀ for the least advantaged position. Being behind the veil of ignorance guarantees
that the conception of justice to emerge will be agreed upon in a fair situation. “Fairness
of the circumsntances under which agreement is reached transfers into the fairness of the
principles agreed to” (Rawls (1974)). Since these principles serve as principles of justice,
the veil of ignorance therefore plays a crucial role in Rawls’ construction of “justice as
fairness”.
In this paper, we shall consider the situation of a Representative who can face three
types of decision-making problem: (1) Behind the veil of ignorance, her preferences will
be called “ethical”;1 (2) in a risky individual decision problem (in front of the veil), her
preferences will be termed “risk preferences”; (3) ﬁnally, in a social choice problem (still in
front of the veil, since the Representative is assumed to know her position), her preferences
will be “social”.2
If Rawls and Harsanyi come to quite diﬀerent conclusions about the form ethical
preferences should take behind the veil of ignorance —respectively the maximin and
the “utilitarian” criteria—, this is mainly due to their diﬀerent view on the attitude of
people towards uncertainty behind the veil of ignorance. Nevertheless, both Harsanyi and
Rawls agree to view the original position as a purely hypothetical situation, a thought
experiment where ethical preferences are theoretical constructs that should conform to
some rationality requirements, paving the road towards various theories of justice.
By contrast, Kariv and Zame (2008) have recently introduced a framework encom-
passing both risk, social and ethical preferences, where they show that, under some as-
sumptions, ethical preferences in the original position are entirely determined by risk and
social preferences, i.e., by preferences that are not hypothetical at all. In other words,
according to these authors, preferences behind the veil of ignorance can be deduced from
preferences in front of the veil of ignorance. Since these authors view risk and social pref-
erences as being essentially arbitrary, they conclude that “there is no conceptual reason
to expect that moral preferences should be consistent with any particular notion of ra-
tionality —or theory of justice”. Thus, at variance with both Rawls and Harsanyi, Kariv
and Zame (2008) reach a conclusion similar to that of Hayek (1976), according to whom
social justice is a “mirage”.
In this paper, we challenge this viewpoint by reexamining the framework introduced
1Following Ricœur’s (1992, p.170) distinction between ethics as the aim of an accomplished life (teleo-
logical perspective) and morality as the norms related to a deontological point of view, we prefer here the
term “ethical” to “moral”.
2For a recent survey of the literature on social preferences, see Fehr and Schmidt (2006).Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent? 3
by Kariv and Zame (2008). Starting with the same setting, but adopting diﬀerent as-
sumptions (which encompass more classic preferences than do the assumptions needed by
Kariv and Zame (2008)), we provide an extremely simple proof of exactly the opposite
result: Risk and social preferences can be entirely deduced from ethical ones. Moreover,
we show by means of examples (see subsection 4.2 below) that many cases of interest
(such as the leximin criterion or utilitarianism) do not fulﬁll Kariv and Zame (2008) as-
sumptions but verify the axioms of this paper. In such examples, not only do risk and
social preferences follow from ethical ones, but the converse is not true: Ethical pref-
erences cannot be deduced from risk and social ones. Thus, we agree with Kariv and
Zame (2008) that there is a link between preferences behind and in front of the veil of
ignorance. In our view, however, the implication goes in the reverse direction: Theories
of justice cannot be reduced to descriptive theories (how people actually behave de facto)
but are indeed normative theories (how people ought to choose). As for risk and social
preferences, they cannot be reduced to descriptive rules of thumb either: They belong to
prescriptive theories (i.e., practical aids to choice) which follow from ethical decisions.
2 Choice environments
Following Kariv and Zame (2008), society consists of N agents, i = 1,...,N, of whom
there is no loss of generality in assuming that the Representative is player 1.3 Three
environments are considered. In the ﬁrst, termed the ethical choice environment, the
objects of choice are allocations of prospects for all members of the society, including the
Representative, but in a setting where the Representative does not know her position in
the society, nor the positions of others. In the second environment, called the social
choice environment, the objects of choice are (deterministic) allocations of prospects for
all the members of society, including the Representative. By contrast with the ethical
environment, the Representative in the social choice environment knows what her social
position will be before taking a decision. In the third, which we term the risk envi-
ronment, objects of choice are random individual prospects for the Representative. As
for prospects, they may designate a huge variety of items: utility levels, income, poverty
indices, etc.4
Choice spaces are formalized as follows:
• The choice space R in the individual risk environment consists of all lotteries,
that is, collections
(pjxj)j=1,...,K, (1)
where (pj)j is a probability vector5, and each xj ∈ R is a prospect.6 The
lottery (1) yields the Representative prospect xj with probability pj.
3In subsection 4.2, Example 2, below, an alternate interpretation of the indices i = 1,...,N will be
proposed.
4Notice that nowhere do we require that preferences increase with respect to prospects.
5That is, pj ≥ 0, for each j, and
P
j pj = 1.
6A prospect may be an income, a utility level or any quantitative characterization of an economic
situation. For simplicity, they are assumed, here, to be real numbers but prospects might take value in a
multi-dimensional space without impairing our results.4 G. Giraud and C. Renouard
• The choice space S in the social choice environment consists of all determin-
istic allocations xj (not to be confused with xj) in RN. This allocation yields
the citizen i the prospect x
j
i with certainty.
Let Perm(N) be the group of permutations σ : N → N. Given some vector x ∈ RN
and some permutation σ ∈ Perm(N), the composition xσ is again an element of RN
assigning prospect xσ(i) to individual i.





where (pσ) is a probability distribution on the ﬁnite set Perm(N) and x ∈ RN.
This lottery yields citizen i prospect xσ(i) with probability pσ. In particular,
it provides the Representative with prospect xσ(1) with probability pσ (for all
σ ∈ Perm(N)).
In the risk environment, the Representative is simply a decision maker who must
choose a random prospect for herself. In the social choice environment, the Representa-
tive is to choose a deterministic prospect for every individual in the society. In the ethical
choice environment, she is to choose a deterministic distribution of prospects across so-
ciety but with the random assignment of individuals to places in society. This ethical
choice environment (with equal probabilities) coincides with Harsanyi’s (1953,1955) for-
malization of ethical decisions.
In the ethical, social choice and risk environments, the Representative’s preference
relations are written  e, s and  r respectively. In order to be able to shift from one
environment to the other, we need to consider a global set-up encompassing both E,S
and R. Let us therefore denote by L the space of lotteries over allocations:
(pjxj)j, (2)
where each xj ∈ RN is an allocation. The lottery given by (2) yields x
j
1 to the Represen-
tative with probability pj. Sometimes, we write (2) in the form (pjxj) when the index is
clear.
Obviously, L encompasses the three environments mentioned supra. To see that R ⊂





∈ L. That is, identify R as the subset of S consisting of
lotteries that yield all individuals other than the Representative the 0 prospect with
probability 1. Similarly, S is identiﬁed with the subset of L consisting of degenerate
lotteries. Finally, E is identiﬁed with the subset of L consisting of lotteries of the form
(pσxσ)σ with the property that xσ = xσ for each σ ∈ Perm(N).
3 Deducing risk preferences from ethical preferences
Preferences will be characterized by two postulates. The ﬁrst gathers hardly con-
troversial rationality requirements on global preferences   over L. Before stating themIs the Veil of Ignorance Transparent? 5
explicitely, let us recall the deﬁnition of compound lotteries. Suppose that L1,...,LK
are K lotteries, and (pk)k=1,...,K is a probability distribution. Then, (pkLk)k denotes a
compound lottery in the following sense: One and only one lottery will be the prize, and
the probability that it will be Lk is pk.
A0 (i) Transitivity. The equivalence relation ∼ on L is transitive.
(ii) Reduction of compound lotteries. Any compound lottery in L is indiﬀferent
to a simple lottery, their probabilities being computed according to the ordi-
nary calculus. In particular, if (qk)k is a probability and each Lk = (pi
kxi)i for
k = 1,...,K, is a lottery, then there is no loss of generality in assuming that
they all involve the same ﬁnite set, (xj)j, of allocations, and moreover
(qkLk)k ∼ (˜ pjxj)j





(iii) Continuity. Given any collection of allocations (x1,...,xK) ∈ SK, ordered
so that xi ≻s xi+1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, then every xi is indiﬀerent in
L to some lottery involving only x1 and xK, i.e., there exists a probability





(iv) Substitutability. In any lottery (pkxk)k and for every i,Xi (as deﬁned by
(3)) can be substituted to xi, that is:
(p1x1,...,pKxK) ∼ (p1x1,...,piXi,...,pKxK).
(v) Weak independence. For every probability (pj) and every pair of arrays of
allocations (xj)j and (yj)j, one has:
xj   yj ∀j ⇒ (pjxj)j   (pjyj)j.
A0 (iii) is a continuity assumption on global preferences  .7 Suppose, indeed, that
x1 ≻s x2 ≻s x3. It is plausible that the lottery (px1,(1 − p)x3) is preferred to x2 as p
approaches 1, and that the preference is inverted when p is close to 0. This assumption
simply says that, as p shifts from 0 to 1, there is some inversion point where the two
are indiﬀerent. A0 (v) is a weakening of the familiar independence axiom, and does not
imply expected utility (even combined with the rest of assumption A0).8 Notice that we
require global preferences   to be neither complete, nor reﬂexive.
The next postulate concerns social choice preferences.
7Cf. Luce and Raiﬀa (1957), p. 27.
8Weak independence is sometimes known as the “sure thing principle”, and is essentially identical to
the game-theoretical principle that a rational individual will avoid using any weakly dominated strategy.6 G. Giraud and C. Renouard
A1 Convertibility. For every x,y ∈ S, there exist (z,σ) ∈ S× Perm(N) such
that
z ∼s x and zσ ∼s y.
A1 says that any pair of allocations in S can be converted into an auxiliary pair of
allocations related to each other by a permutation. Convertibility is implied by (but does
not imply) the following selﬁshness assumption introduced by Kariv and Zame (2008):9
B1 selﬁshness. x ∼s (x1,0,...,0) for every x ∈ S.
Unfortunately, postulate A1 on social choice preferences is not satisﬁed by many examples
of interest (see subsection 4.2 infra). Therefore, we shall consider as well an alternative
postulate on global preferences:
A2 Reduction of lotteries. For every lottery L ∈ L, there exists a deterministic
allocation x ∈ S such that:
x ∼ L.
Theorem.— 1) For all ethical preferences  e and for social preferences satisfying
A1, there is a unique global preference relation   on L verifying A0 such that
its restriction to E coincides with  e. Hence, if   verify A0 and are such that
 s satisfy A1, then both risk preferences,  r, and social preferences,  s, are
determined by ethical preferences  e.
2) For all ethical and social preferences  e, there is a unique global preference
relation   on L verifying A0 and A2 such that its restriction to E coincides with
 e. Hence, if   veriﬁes both A0 and A2, then risk preferences,  r, and social
preferences,  s, are determined by ethical preferences  e.
Proof. 1) Since S ⊂ E, social preferences can be deduced from ethical preferences.
What we have to prove is that global preferences   over L can be deduced from eth-
ical preferences  e (although, obviously, L is not a subset of E). Given assumption
A0(i)-(iv) on global preferences  , they verify the following property:10 For any lottery
(pjxj)j=1,...,K ∈ L, it is possible to ﬁnd a lottery involving only x1 and xK, and to which





Therefore, for our purposes, it suﬃces to prove that the restriction of global preferences




can be deduced from  e. Assumption
A1 enables us to ﬁnd (z,σ) ∈ S× Perm(N) such that x ∼s z and y ∼s zσ. Given ethical















9To see that B1 ⇒ A1, consider z := (x1,y1,0,...0) and zσ := (y1,x1,0,...,0). B1 implies that z ∼s x
and zσ ∼s y.
10See Luce and Raiﬀa (1957, p. 28).Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent? 7
Clearly, global preferences deﬁned this way will coincide with ethical preferences when
restricted to E, and hence with social preferences when restricted to S. On the other
hand, since global preferences satisfy A0(i)-(v), they are uniquely deﬁned. Therefore,
their restriction to R yields a unique preference relation,  r, in the risk environment.




there exist x,y ∈ S with x ∼ L1 and y ∼ L2. Deﬁne global preferences   by
L1   L2 ⇐⇒ x  e y.
￿
Example 4 in subsection 4.2 will show that our Theorem is tight in the sense that one
cannot relax both A1 and A2 without impairing our result.
4 Discussion
An alternative approach to the whole issue would permit us to reach our conclusion
even more easily. It consists in completing the ethical space E by allowing for compound
lotteries. Notice, indeed, that E (as deﬁned in section 2) is not closed with respect to




need not belong to
E —but to L. Actually, adding compound lotteries to E yields the whole space L. Thus,
with such an enlarged ethical space, our result would be trivial since ethical preferences
 e would already be deﬁned on L. What this paper shows, therefore, is that, even if one
adopts a narrow framework where compound lotteries are not allowed to be part of the
ethical choice space, the same conclusion can be reached.
4.1 Deducing ethics from economic decisions?
The previous section provided fairly weak assumptions under which risk and social
preferences are uniquely determined by ethical ones. By contrast, we provide, now, a
somewhat severe restriction that will be shown to be equivalent to the opposite property,
that is, under which ethical preferences can be deduced from risk and social ones.
C Probabilistic self-regarding. 1) Let (pσxσ) and (qσyσ) be two lotteries in E\S
such that (pσxσ)  e (qσyσ). Then, there exists a pair, (˜ xσ, ˜ yσ)σ, of allocations






















Roughly speaking, condition C says that 1) every non-degenerate random allocation in E
is indiﬀerent to some random allocation in R, and 2) when evaluating a random allocation
in E, the Representative does not pay attention to the way randomness aﬀects citizens
diﬀerent from herself. To put it diﬀerently, the attitude towards risk of citizens diﬀerent
from 1 has no impact on global preferences. We view this as a particularly severe restric-
tion: How “ethical” are ethical preferences neglecting the risk aversion of the population’s
vast majority ?8 G. Giraud and C. Renouard
Proposition 1.— If ethical preferences,  e, satisfy weak independence (A0(v)),
then the two following conditions are equivalent:
(a) Given  r and  s, ethical preferences,  e, are uniquely determined.
(b)  e verify C.
Proof.


















Then, consider two global preferences,  1 and  2, whose restrictions to R and S both
coincide with  r and  s, and such that, for some (qσyσ) ∈ E:
(pσxσ)  1 (qσyσ) while (pσxσ) ≺2 (qσyσ).
Then, the restrictions to E of  1 and  2 do not coincide although both global preferences
are compatible with  r and  s. Hence  e is not uniquely determined by risk and social
choice preferences.
Suppose, next, that E = E but there exists a pair of lotteries, (pσxσ),(qσyσ), with the





































e  = e although they are both compatible with  r and  s. Hence, given risk and
social preferences, ethical preferences are not uniquely deﬁned.
(b) ⇒ (a). It suﬃces to deﬁne  ∗
e as above, and to conclude from weak independence
that ethical preferences are uniquely deﬁned once  r and  s are given. ￿
Let us now recall the restrictions on social preferences introduced by Kariv and Zame
(2008). In addition to being complete, transitive, reﬂexive, and continuous (A0(iii)), they
need to verify:
B2 The worst outcome. x  s 0 for every x ∈ S.
This requirement is speciﬁc to their framework as they impose allocations to take value
in RN
+. No such restriction is needed in our set-up.
B3 Self-regarding. For each x ∈ S, there is a t ∈ R+ such that (t,0,...,0)  s x.
Clearly, “selﬁshness” (B1) is a strengthening of “self-regarding” (B3). The two results
proven in Kariv and Zame (2008) that are of interest to us are the following:
11Recall that   need not be transitive.Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent? 9
Proposition 2.— (Kariv and Zame (2008)) 1) For all risk preferences and
social preferences that satisfy B2 and B3, there is a unique preference relation  
on L verifying A0(v) and such that its restriction to S (resp. R) coincides with
 s (resp.  r). Hence, if   veriﬁes Weak independence, then ethical preferences
 e are determined by risk preferences,  r, and social preferences,  s.
2) If social preferences are selﬁsh (i.e., satisfy B1), then   has the following
property: For all lotteries (pjxj),(qkyk) ∈ L,












It is easily shown that, if A0(v), B2 and B3 are fulﬁlled, so is C. Hence, Part 1 of
Proposition 2 follows from Part 2 of our Proposition 1. The second part of Proposition 2
says that, if the Representative is perfectly selﬁsh (in the sense of B1) in the social choice
environment, then preferences in the risk environment coincide with ethical preferences.
Given the widespread use of expected utility as a formalization of risk preferences, this
seems to promote a deﬁnition of ethical preferences as being given by the expected utility












Notice, however, that Proposition 2 is hardly compatible with (4) since this criterion does
not verify selﬁshness B1 unless the weights (λi)i attributed to citizens are λ1 > 0 and
λi = 0 for every i  = 1 —in which case (4) simply reduces to dictatorship. Nor would
(4) fulﬁll B1 once prospects are allowed to take values that are unbounded from below.
Whether (4) can be understood in terms of Harasanyi’s “utilitarian ethics” is discussed
below in Example 2.
4.2 Examples
The ﬁrst three examples satisfy our axioms but fail to verify C (hence the assumptions
adopted by Kariv and Zame (2008) as well). The last example shows that our main result
fails if neither A1 nor A2 obtain.
Example 1. The Maximin criterion (both with respect to risk and with respect to









It fulﬁlls A0 and A2 but fails to verify B2, B3 (hence B1), A1 and C.12 Moreover, ethical
preferences  e cannot be deduced from risk,  r, and social preferences  s. Indeed, the
restriction of (5) to allocations of the form (x1,0,...,0) yields a constant mapping, so
that risk preferences are trivial. On the other hand, consider the auxiliary global utility
function:


















The restriction of (6) to R and S yields the same risk and social preferences as (5), while
the restrictions of both global utilites to the ethical environment, E, are distinct. Hence,
ethical preferences cannot be deduced from  r and  s.
Following Harsanyi (1975, 1978), one has argued that the risk preferences induced
by (5) in the R setting are hardly realistic. Quite on the contrary, both theoretical
investigations (see, e.g., Artzner et al. (1999)) and empirical practices of stress tests in
the ﬁnancial industry suggest that behaviors at least close to the ones dictated by (5)
are not relegated to exotic matters, even in the highly speciﬁc set-up of individual risk.
Similarly, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) have reintroduced the maximin principle within
decision theory in face of uncertainty. On the (deterministic) social choice side, such an
egalitarian criterion has been strongly advocated by Fleurbaye and Maniquet (2006) in a
purely ordinal setting.
Example 2. Consider lotteries involving at most K ≥ 2 allocations,13 (xk)k, ordered
so that pk+1 ≤ pk for k = 1,...,K − 1. A criterion akin to some kind of “utilitarianism”















i ∈ R. This alternate criterion fulﬁlls A0 and A2 but fails to verify B1, B2 and
A1. Moreover, when the individual weights λk
i depend upon k in a non-trivial way, C is
not satisﬁed either, so that ethical preferences  e cannot be deduced from risk  r and
social  s preferences. Indeed, neither  r nor  s depend upon λk
i for k ≥ 2 and i ≥ 2.
On the side of individual risk, (7) corresponds to risk-neutrality which is widely used for
pricing and hedging ﬁnancial derivatives. On the side of social choice, it has received an
axiomatic foundation by Mertens and Dhillon (1999).
There has been considerable controversy over “utilitarian ethics” in the way it is
defended by Harsanyi, as in the debate between Sen (1976, 1977, 1986) and Harsanyi
(1975, 1977a). Here, when pσ = 1/N! for each permutation σ ∈ Perm(N), our frame-
work becomes compatible with Harsanyi’s (1975) “equi-probability model of moral value
judgments”. To see this point, recall that, in Harsanyi’s (1978) view, the Representa-
tive “would certainly satisfy our impartiality and impersonality requirements if he did
not know how his choice between [lotteries] A and B would aﬀect him personally and,
in particular, if he did not know what his own social position would be in situations A
and B”. Thus, the Representative is assumed to think that in either (randomly selected)
situation he would have the same probability 1/N to occupy any one of the N possible
social positions. Therefore, in Harsanyi (1978), the Representative does not even know
her own risk preferences, as these preferences are attached to the position she will occupy,
while, here, a lottery in E involves various random prospects to individuals i = 1,...,N
(including the Representative) knowing her own, ﬁxed, risk preferences,  i
r.
Nevertheless, our approach is broad enough to encompass Harsanyi’s set-up as a par-
ticular case of ours: Suppose that the index i = 1,...,N does not label individuals but
“social positions”, which may be occupied by every individual. Take L = 1 and suppose
13We know from the proof of the Theorem that this involves no loss of generality.Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent? 11
that each position i = 1,...,N is identiﬁed with a given utility function: Ui : A → R
deﬁned on some auxiliary space, A, of random situations, (pkAk)k. An allocation of
prospects, (xi)i ∈ RN, is now a N-tuple of utility levels (Ui(A))i, derived from any ran-
dom situation A ∈ A.14 Restrict E to equiprobable lotteries, (pσxσ)σ∈Perm(N), of size N!,
with pσ = 1/N!, every σ. By construction, a form of “selﬁshness” is implicit in Harsanyi’s
framework since, whatever being her position i, the Representative only cares about her
own individual risk preferences, Ui, associated to this very position, and not about the
preferences of the other citizens occupying diﬀerent positions — so that B1, now, makes
sense. Within this speciﬁc set-up, Proposition 2-2 provides a ﬁrst step towards Harsanyi’s
conslusion. It suﬃces, indeed, to complete the assumptions needed for Proposition 2-2 by
any axiomatics which characterizes individual risk preferences in terms of expected utility























The advantage of this reformulation is to illuminate the role of the selﬁshness requirement
B1 underlying this “utilitarian”15 appproach of ethics.16
Example 3. (Kariv and Zame (2008)) Take N = 2. Let g : R → R be any continuous,
strictly increasing function with the property that g(t) = t for t ≤ 0. Deﬁne the global














for any simple lottery in L involving only two allocations (x1,y1) and (x2,y2) with p1 ≥
p2.17 The restriction of Wg on R does not depend on g since g(t) = t for t ≤ 0. The social
preferences induced by Wg on S do not depend upon g because g is strictly increasing.
However, the ethical preferences induces by Wg on E do depend on g: The weight given to
inequality between citizens depends on g. Hence, ethical preferences cannot be deduced
from risk and social choice preferences, so that Proposition 1 above fails. This is due
to the failure of B2: Preferences induced by Wg on S are not self-regarding. Neither
are they probabilistically self-regarding, so that C is, in turn, violated. By contrast, the
intermediate value theorem ensures that Wg veriﬁes A2, while A0 is obvious. Hence, our
Theorem holds in this setting.
14Admittedly, this construction involves interpersonal utility comparisons —which is consistent with
Harsanyi’s (1977b, 1978) claim that “there are non valid arguments against such comparisons”. Though
we do believe that there are valid arguments against intersubjective comparisons (whose discussion would
go beyond the scope of this paper and is abundantly illustrated in the litterature), it is only fair to permit
them in order to characterize Harsanyi’s setting as a particular instance of ours.
15Quotation marks, here, wish to emphasize that Harsanyi’s terminology does not reﬂect the much
broader standpoint of, say, John Stuart Mill (1861), for whom “utilitarianism” also encompasses non-self-
oriented behaviors (e.g., the Biblical Golden rule) which obviously contradict B1.
16See the discussion of (4) supra.
17By the same argument as in the proof of our Theorem, it suﬃces to consider such simple lotteries.12 G. Giraud and C. Renouard
Example 4. Again, take N = 2. Let f : R → R be continuous, strictly increasing with
the property that f(t) = t whenever t ≥ 0. Deﬁne the global utility function Uf,λ : L → R




with p1 ≥ p2:









for a given parameter λ ∈ R \ {0}. The risk preferences induced by Uf,λ on R reduce to













and do not depend on f (as f(t) = t for t ≥ 0). Nor do
social choice preferences since, for every allocation (x1,y1) ∈ S, Uf,λ(x1,y1) = f(|x1|−y1),
and f is strictly increasing. However, the ethical preferences induced by Uf,λ on E do
depend on f, again because the weight given to inequality depends upon f. Thus, ethical
preferences cannot be deduced from risk and social choice preferences. This time, it is
B1 that fails: There is no worst outcome. On the other hand, that C is not satisﬁed
is obvious. At variance with Example 3, however, Uf,λ does not verify our convertibility
assumption A1. Similarly, Uf,λ does not satisfy A2 in general, so that our Theorem fails





being the probability p ∈ (0,1] with p ≥ 1−p.18 Hence, ethical preferences do not depend
upon λ, while global preferences do. In particular, risk preferences depend upon λ, and
hence, cannot be deduced from ethical ones.
4.3 Ethics and economic decisions
How realistic is our conclusion that ethical preferences cannot be deduced from every-
day behavior on the economic ﬁeld? Many contemporary “utilitarians” have claimed that
voting for the maximin principle is only optimal for inﬁnitely risk averse Representatives.
This argument takes as granted that each person is only interested in her own material
payoﬀ —not surprisingly, this is exactly assumption B1— and claims that it is legitimate
to disregard the Maximin principle on the ground that people’s everyday behavior does
not ﬁt with inﬁnite risk-aversion. This presupposes exactly what this paper challenges,
namely that ethical preferences can be deduced from risk preferences.
However, H¨ orisch (2007) has implemented the Rawlsian thought experiment of a veil
of ignorance as a laboratory experiment. There, it is found that both men and women
react to the risk introduced by the veil of ignorance ina way that is signiﬁcantly distinct
from their attitude towards risk in front of the veil. Women additionally exhibit social
preferences that reﬂect an increased concern for equality. These ﬁndings conﬁrm the main
message of the present paper. Indeed, if people have social preferences that do not satisfy
B1, they can be in favor of an egalitarian distribution even if they are, say, risk-neutral.
Conversly, one could question the “realism” of our assertion that economic decisions
are inﬂuenced by ethical convictions. In fact, ethical views inﬂuence investor as well as
consumer choices, not only at the time of presbyterian pietism studied in Weber’s (1904)
celebrated monograph, but also today. For example, in 2006, the UN launched an initia-
tive called “Principles for Responsible Investments”:19 The asset owners and investment
18Here, σ denotes the unique non-trivial permutation over {1,2}.
19See http://www.unpri.org.Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent? 13
managers who sign the six principles commit themselves to integrate ESG (environmental,
social and governance) criteria in their investment decisions. By May 2008, 362 investors
had signed these principles, representing 14.4 trillion dollars of investments. Fair Trade is
also an alternative way of doing business that seeks to build equitable, long-term partner-
ships between consumers in Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and North America
together with producers in developing regions. The global Fair Trade sales in 2007 are
worth 2.65 billion euros. The highest market penetration is Switzerland where the average
consumer annually spends more than 21 euros on Fair Trade products.20
Finally, current initiatives in favour of social business (Yunus (2008)) express the will
of entrepreneurs to endorse new economic models centered on the needs of the poor, even
if these actions are less proﬁtable than conventional businesses.
Let us conclude with a ﬁnal remark. Nussbaum (2006, p. 17) criticizes the social con-
tract theorists, and Rawls among them, in as much as they see the society as a contract
for mutual advantage between people who are free, equal and independent. This perspec-
tive does not take into account people who suﬀer from impairments or disabilities. Even
though we agree with Nussbaum’s criticism, we did not address the issue in this paper:
The parties behind the veil of ignorance do not possess any serious physical or mental
impairments that would prevent them from exhibiting “preference” relations fulﬁlling A0
and either A1 or A2. However, the citizens for whom they design principles could suﬀer
from such disabilities.
Ga¨ el Giraud, CNRS, Paris School of Economics, gael.giraud@parisschoolofeconomics.eu.
C´ ecile Renouard, ESSEC Business School, Paris, renouard@essec.fr.
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